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Abstract 
Despite various expected advantages, university-industry research collaboration (UIC), a 
relationship between two different worlds, often faces serious difficulties. Thus, the 
performance of UIC depends on the research partners’ strategies to bridge the gaps between 
them according to the institutional environment. In Japan, UIC has developed rapidly since 
the late 1990s based on drastic institutional changes regarding universities. We pay special 
attention to the role of the university intellectual property (IP) policy introduced after 2003 
and empirically examine its impact on the performance of UIC projects. A clear and 
equitable IP policy that can be applied flexibly to the needs of partners would be optimal for 
a UIC to be efficiently managed. Otherwise, the project might face serious conflicts of 
interests and low incentive for cooperation. Using a sample of Japanese firms from our 
original survey, we find that the IP policy of partner universities indeed has a positive and 
significant impact on various performances of UIC projects, controlling for firm and project 
characteristics and considering potential selection bias from UIC participation. 
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The open innovation system, especially university-industry research collaboration (hereafter 
UIC), has been attracting considerable attention worldwide. Through UIC, researchers at 
universities can access research funds and benefit from the ideas and expertise of private 
firms, while the latter can absorb and utilize the advanced scientific knowledge created at 
universities. 
However, participation in a UIC as such does not necessarily guarantee its success. UIC 
is a complex relationship between extremely different worlds. Researchers in academia and 
private business often have considerably different interests, objectives, constraints, and 
incentives. Such disparities may cause serious conflicts, misunderstanding, and distrust 
between the partners of UIC, and thus lower the satisfaction of the participants and decrease 
the effectiveness of UIC (Das and Teng 1998; Grilli and Milano 2009). Therefore, how to 
manage a UIC project by bridging different cultures should be a key consideration for the 
success of UIC (Mora-Valentin et al. 2004), even as the strategies for managing UIC are 
constrained by the institutional environment. 
In Japan, UIC has increased and intensified rapidly since the late 1990s. The recent 
development of UIC in Japan follows some major changes in the national innovation system, 
especially in the university system (Hemmert et al. 2008; Woolgar 2007). Under the Science 
and Technology Basic Plan launched in 1996, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, 
Science and Technology (MEXT) has promoted the establishment of Technology Licensing 
Organizations (TLO) since 1998 and Intellectual Property (IP) Centers since 2003 in 
Japanese universities. In addition to some other legal and institutional changes, Japanese 
universities have been activating their IP policy as one of their most important strategies. 
According to MEXT (2009), 58% of all universities (92% of national universities) drew up 
an IP policy by 2008, the year of our survey. Therefore, in this paper, we pay special 
attention to the university IP policy as an advantage of using recent Japanese data. 
The IP policy of the partner university may affect the UIC performance by determining 
the basic rules of UIC with regard to the management of existing and generated IP. A clear 
and equitable IP policy that can be flexibly applied to the needs of partners would be 
optimal for a UIC to be efficiently managed. Otherwise, the project might face serious 
conflicts of interests and low incentive for cooperation. 
Thus, by focusing on the IP policy of partner universities, we empirically investigate 
the determinants of UIC performance in Japan using original survey data. In this paper, UIC 
is defined as project-based collaboration in research and development (R&D) between 
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universities and private companies aiming at the generation or transfer of new technologies, 
products, or processes. Unlike most previous studies, we integrate the analyses of both UIC 
participation and performance by using Heckman’s two-step procedure to check and control 
for possible sample selection bias from UIC participation. We examine the effects of firm 
and top manager’s characteristics in the first step, and then those of firm and project 
characteristics (focusing on the partner university’s IP policy) in the second step. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We provide a brief review of 
previous literature in Section 2 and the development of UIC in Japan in Section 3. The 
conceptual framework and the hypotheses are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we 
explain the empirical methodology and present the data, and discuss the empirical results in 
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper. 
2. Literature review 
Several studies have thus far investigated the effectiveness of technology transfer by 
universities or technology transfer offices (TTOs) (Anderson et al. 2007; Caldera and 
Debande 2010; Chapple et al. 2005; Debackere and Veugelers 2005; Friedmand and 
Silberman 2003; Macho-Stadler et al. 2007; Siegel et al. 2003; Siegel et al. 2007; Thursby 
et al. 2001; Thursby and Kemp 2002; Thursby and Thursby 2002). 
Siegel et al. (2007) summarize recent empirical studies on university TTOs and the key 
factors for their performance, reporting that the performance of technology transfer is 
affected by university characteristics, including ownership (public or private), academic 
quality, local conditions of high-tech demand, and the design of licensing contract as well as 
TTO characteristics such as size and age. More recently, Caldera and Debande (2010) 
examined how TTO characteristics affect university’s performance of technology transfer, 
controlling for the nature and type of technology transfer and academic quality. Using the 
survey data on technology transfer activities of 52 universities in Spain over 2001–2005, 
they find that university’s rules on the conflicts of interests between academic teaching 
responsibilities and external activities have a positive effect on R&D contracts, licenses, or 
spin-off creation. In sum, previous empirical studies suggest the importance of university IP 
policy for the performance of technology transfer from universities. However, the effects of 
university IP policy on the performance of collaborative R&D between university and 
industry have never been explicitly addressed. 
Most studies of UIC performance examine the effect of engaging in UIC as such and 













firms, measured by the number of patent applications (e.g., George et al. 2002; Zucker and 
Darby 2001). A recent study by Eom and Lee (2010) demonstrates that UIC participation in 
Korea improves both firm and innovation performance. However, few studies empirically 
investigate how project and partner characteristics affect UIC performance. Okamuro 
(2007) analyzes how project characteristics affect technological and commercial success of 
inter-firm R&D cooperation, but not of UIC. Hemmert et al. (2009) examine the effect of 
project characteristics on trust formation in UIC, but not on project performance. 
Characteristics of UIC projects may change and develop as they proceed. However, 
existing studies do not explicitly consider the development of UIC projects, except for 
Mora-Valentin et al. (2004), who examine the effects of project characteristics on the 
performance of cooperative R&D, distinguishing between contextual factors (initial 
conditions) and organizational factors (how the project is organized and managed). They 
provide an empirical model that integrates various factors from several previous studies in 
management science and find that both contextual and organizational factors affect UIC 
performance. However, their model comprises only these factors and does not include other 
basic project or partner characteristics. 
Most previous studies investigate the determinants of either participation or 
performance of UIC, thus addressing these research issues separately. However, empirical 
results of UIC performance can be subject to latent sample selection bias, unless the 
probability of UIC participation is randomly given (Eom and Lee 2010). Therefore, we 
should check and control for possible influence of the determinants of UIC participation on 
UIC performance. Eom and Lee (2010) employ Heckman’s two-step procedure to cope with 
sample selection bias, but in the second step (performance function), they focus only on 
firm characteristics. 
Thus, we propose and employ a two-step procedure to integrate the estimations of the 
determinants of UIC participation and UIC performance, including the characteristics of the 
top manager and the firm in the first step, and project and partner characteristics (including 
the partner university’s IP policy) in the second step. Most previous studies use firm-side 
data for empirical analysis and neglect university-side data. With rapid changes in the 
university system, the strategy of the partner university with regard to intellectual property 
(IP) policy is particularly important, especially in the Japanese context. 
Finally, previous empirical studies on UIC, including the studies on the determinants of 
UIC participation, concentrate on Western countries, especially in Europe, and few studies 
on UIC have been carried out in Japan and in East Asia (Eom and Lee 2010; Hemmert et al. 














                                                 






Thus, our study has the following major contributions to the literature: First, we focus 
on project and partner characteristics as the determinants of UIC performance rather than 
examining the effect of UIC participation itself. More specifically, we shed light on the role 
of the university IP policy, which is important in the context of rapid changes in the 
university system. Second, by using Heckman’s two-step procedure, we check and control 
for potential sample selection bias of participating in UIC. Finally, this is a pioneering 
empirical research on the determinants of both the participation in and performance of the 
UIC in Japan. 
3. Development of UIC in Japan 
In this section, we will sketch the development and institutional background of UIC in 
Japan. Formal and informal UIC has been active for more than 100 years
1, encompassing a 
large part of the history of Japanese universities. Therefore, it would be too simplistic to 
assume that UIC is underdeveloped in Japan or lags far behind the United States and Europe. 
However, UIC was legally constrained after World War II as a public reaction against the 
cooperation with the defense industry during the wartime and became even more inactive 
after the 1960s
2. 
Although MEXT changed its university policy to permit UIC during the 1980s, the 
crucial moment in the establishment of a science and technology policy came in 1995 with 
the Science and Technology Basic Law. Two important initiatives aimed at promoting UIC 
were taken under the first Science and Technology Basic Plan (1996–2000): “The act to 
promote technology transfer from universities” in 1998—the so-called TLO Act—which 
financially supports the Technology Licensing Organizations (TLOs) at universities, and 
“the special act to regenerate industrial vitality” in 1999, which enabled national 
universities to retain IP rights based on government research funds (the Japanese version of 
the U.S. Bayh-Dole). According to the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) (2011), 
there were 46 officially acknowledged TLOs in September 2010, of which 38 were 
affiliated to national or public universities. 
Under the second Science and Technology Basic Plan (2001–2005), the university 




2  Even during the period when formal UIC was inactive, close informal relationships were in place. 

These informal relationships were formed and maintained through the placement of students
 


















system in Japan experienced further drastic changes. In 2003, MEXT started to set up IP 
Centers at universities to manage and improve the use of intellectual property. By March 
2009, 22% of all universities (81% of national universities) established IP Centers, and the 
number of patents applied by Japanese universities increased four times from 2,462 in 2003 
to 9,869 in 2007 (MEXT 2009). In 2004, national universities were transformed into more 
independent university corporations. In 2005, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI) achieved its goal to create 1,000 academic spin-offs within five years. It is also 
noteworthy that the constraints on the faculty of national universities to work for private 
firms have been relaxed systematically since 2000. In order to promote UIC at the regional 
level, METI launched the Industrial Cluster Project in 2001, followed by MEXT’s 
Intellectual Cluster Project in 2002
3. 
Supported by these policies, the number of R&D collaborations between national 
universities and private firms etc. increased remarkably from 56 in 1983 to 2,568 in 1998 
and to 14,303 in 2008 (MEXT 2009; National Institute of Science and Technology Policy 
2003)
4. The number of joint R&D projects involving private and public universities 
(prefectural and municipal) amounted to 3,335 in 2008, so that national universities 
accounted for the majority of UIC projects (81%). 
It is noteworthy that small firms play an important and increasing role in R&D 
collaboration with national universities
5: their share in the joint R&D projects with national 
universities has consistently increased, from 13% in the mid-1980s (1983–1986) to 40% at 
the beginning of the 21st century (2001–2004)
6. 
4. Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
Previous empirical studies concentrate on the effect of UIC participation as such 
and not on the determinants of UIC performance. Focusing on inter-firm R&D cooperation, 
Okamuro (2007) argues and demonstrates that contractual and organizational characteristics 
3See Nishimura and Okamuro (2011a, 2011b) for more details of these cluster projects.

4These numbers do not include commissioned (contracted) research projects. National universities 

include national graduate institutes and junior colleges. Public organizations and local authorities 

count among private firms etc. This statistic counts only the formal projects reported to MEXT from 

each national university since 1983.

5According to the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law revised in 1999, small businesses in the 





6In calculating the share of small businesses, the number of joint R&D projects with private firms 














                                                 
 
of cooperative projects significantly affect technological and commercial success of joint 
R&D. With regard to UIC, the organization and management of the project may be even 
more crucial for project performance compared to inter-firm cooperation, because UIC is a 
partnership between completely different types of organizations with different objectives, 
interests, administration, and incentive systems. To bridge the gap between such different 
worlds and to achieve high performance in UIC, project and partner characteristics that 
promote sufficient information sharing, efficient coordination, and mutual trust are essential 
(Barnes et al. 2002; Hemmert et al. 2009; Mora-Valentin et al. 2004). 
Specifically, the IP policy of the partner university may significantly affect UIC 
performance. This is a particularly important and interesting issue for Japan, where 
universities rapidly establish TLOs and IP Centers to make efficient use of their patents and 
to smooth or promote UICs, as mentioned before. The university IP policy determines the 
basic rules of UIC with regard to the management of existing and generated IP
7. A clear and 
equitable IP policy that can be applied flexibly to the needs of partners would be optimal for 
a UIC to be efficiently managed. Otherwise, the project might face serious conflicts of 
interests and low incentive for cooperation. Hence, we present the first hypothesis as 
follows: 
H1: Clear, equitable, and flexible IP policy of the partner university positively affects UIC 
performance. 
Moreover, if the IP policy of the partner university affects UIC performance by promoting 
effective coordination among project members, as explained above, the effect of the 
university IP policy on UIC performance is expected to be mediated by the effectiveness of 
coordination in the project or the efforts for effective coordination. By measuring the 
effectiveness of coordination in UIC based on the levels of communication quality and 
firm’s commitment, we postulate the second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: The effect of the partner university’s IP policy on UIC performance is mediated by the 
level of communication quality in and firm’s commitment to the project. 
We may regard the IP policy of the university as exogenous. The IP policy of a university is 
administratively determined at the head office or the IP Center, conditioned by government 
7  In Japan, IP policy may differ across universities according to their conditions. Each university 
















                                                 
 
 
policies, and managed by IP managers who are dispatched by MEXT or directly hired by 
university administration. Even professors cannot determine or influence the IP policy of 
their own universities, especially at national universities, where even the most distinguished 
researchers are treated equally with less productive and refutable colleagues. With regard to 
the decision by firm’s managers, we assume that they select university partners according to 
their research capability and research matching, but not according to the university IP policy. 
Therefore, the university IP policy can be regarded as exogenous and independent of any 
strategies of the UIC partners
8. 
5. Empirical strategy 
5.1. Empirical models and variables 
We estimate the determinants of UIC participation and UIC performance in an 
integrated way, using Heckman’s two-step procedure (cf. Eom and Lee 2010). In this way, 
we can also control for potential sample selection bias with regard to UIC participation 
(Heckman 1979). A firm with higher R&D capability is more likely to be involved in UIC 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Fontana et al. 2006; Lopez 2008). Therefore, in the first step, 
we estimate the probability of UIC engagement using a probit model with the whole sample 
to examine what type of firm is willing to collaborate with universities. In the second step, 
we investigate the effect of the university IP policy on UIC performance by OLS with a 
sub-sample of UIC participants, controlling for sample selection bias. We also control for 
several project characteristics following Mora-Valentin et al. (2004). 
5.1.1. First step: Determinants of UIC participation 
We estimate a probit model to analyze the determinants of UIC participation. The 
empirical specification is as follows: 
Prob(UIC)  f (top managers' education, firm characteristics). 
The dependent variable is a UIC dummy (uic), which takes on the value of one if a firm 
engaged in and finished a UIC project during the preceding three years, and zero otherwise. 
8  Hall et al. (2001) point out that IP issues are major barriers for firms to cooperate with universities. 
Therefore, we cannot completely exclude the possibility of sample selection bias in the sense that 
failed attempts of UIC due to poor or unfavorable IP policy are not observable and thus not included 












We use top managers’ education and firm characteristics as independent variables. 
Top managers’ education 
Focusing on start-up firms, Okamuro et al. (2011) show that top managers’ human 
capital, including their graduate education, significantly affects firms’ propensity to 
cooperate with universities and public research institutes. They argue that especially for 
small start-ups, top managers’ human capital proxies extensive network and high capability 
of the firms, and signals their capability to potential partners, thereby allowing the firms to 
find university partners more easily. Therefore, we assume that firms that have top 
managers with higher education level are more likely to participate in UIC. 
We distinguish between different educational levels and backgrounds using five dummy 
variables: (1) graduates of junior high schools or high schools (who do not have university 
degrees), (2) bachelors in the human or social sciences (univ_soc), (3) bachelors in the 
natural sciences (univ_nat), (4) those with graduate degrees in the human or social sciences 
(grad_soc), and (5) those with graduate degrees in the natural sciences (grad_nat). We use 
the first group as the baseline reference in our model. If top managers’ educational level is 
important for UIC participation, we can expect positive signs for the coefficients of 
univ_soc, univ_nat, grad_soc, and grad_nat. We may also expect an education in the natural 
sciences to have a stronger effect on UIC participation than that in the human or social 
sciences, because top managers with a natural science background may have lower barriers 
to UIC. 
Firm characteristics 
We use dummies for firm age (age), number of employees (emp), R&D ratio to sales 
(rd_ratio), and firms’ technology dummies as the variables of firm characteristics variables. 
Firm age (age) may be a proxy for accumulated experience and network formation. The 
number of employees (emp) is a measure of firm size. R&D ratio to sales is regarded as 
R&D intensity. Dummy variables of technology fields, that is, biotechnology (d_bio), 
microelectronics (d_micro), and software (d_soft, reference group), are included in the 
model to control for technological opportunities. According to the previous literature 
(Fritsch and Lukas 2001; Mohnen and Hoareau 2003), we postulate that age, emp, and 
rd_ratio have positive effects on UIC participation. 
5.1.2. Second step: Determinants of UIC performance 
















selection bias, we incorporate in the model the inverse Mills ratio, which is calculated in the 
probit model. Our empirical model is described as follows: 
UIC performance = f (partner characteristics, project characteristics, firm 
characteristics, inverse Mills ratio). 
We use four dependent variables on UIC performance obtained from the survey data. We 
asked the respondent firms for their subjective evaluation of UIC performance using a 
7-point Likert scale (where 1 = do not agree at all and 7 = strongly agree) with regard to the 
extent to which they agree with the following statements: (1) the results and benefits of this 
UIC met our expectations (expected_results), and (2) the UIC was a technical success 
(tech_success). We also asked them to categorize the concrete technological outcomes they 
could achieve as a direct result of UIC, using a 7-point Likert scale (where 1 = none and 7 = 
lot) regarding (1) new patent applications (patents) and (2) new products developed 
(products). 
The independent variables comprise partner, project, and firm characteristics. 
Partner characteristics 
We pay special attention to the IP policy of the partner university, considering the 
recent emergence and development of IP policies at Japanese universities. We measure the 
firm’s evaluation of the partner university’s IP policy with regard to clearness, equitability 
(in sharing revenue and royalty), and flexibility to meet the needs of partners, using 7-point 
Likert scales (Appendix 1) and construct the variable univ_ip as the average value of these 
three items (later we use these items separately). According to Hypothesis 1, we expect the 
coefficient of this variable to be positive. We also include the national university dummy 
(national_univ) to control for the differences among UICs with national, other public, and 
private universities. Further, we use the firm’s evaluation of the research capability of its 
partner university regarding the level of scientific research and specific knowledge 
(research_capability) to control for the partner’s competence. This variable is measured by 
a single questionnaire item using a 7-point Likert scale (Appendix 1). Finally, the distance 
to the university partner (distance) is included in the model, which is a categorical variable 
that takes one of the following six values: 1 = less than 10 km, 2 = 10–20 km, 3= 21–50 km, 












                                                 
 
Project characteristics 
With regard to project characteristics, we use two types of ex ante relationship factors 
that are determined prior to the UIC and two kinds of ex post relationship factors that are 
determined after the beginning of UIC, following Mora-Valentin et al. (2004). 
The former variables of ex ante factors comprise (1) the closeness of the relationship 
with the university partners before the UIC (close_relationship) and (2) the extent of 
contractual safeguards on performance obligation, project schedules and budget, data 
protection, profit sharing, etc., regarding UIC (contract). Both of them are measured using 
7-point Likert scales. We created this variable by calculating the mean of evaluation scores 
of eight related questionnaire items, while the variable close_relationship is derived from a 
single item in the survey (Appendix 1). We expect these variables to have positive effects on 
UIC performance. 
The latter variables of ex post factors include (1) communication quality with regard to 
timeliness, reliability, and completeness of information exchange in UIC (commuquality) 
and (2) strength of commitment by the participating firm (commitment). These variables are 
constructed by a subjective evaluation based on 7-point Likert scales (Appendix 1). 
According to Hypothesis 2, the effect of university IP policy (univ_ip) is mediated by these 
variables; we expect that, when they are included in the model, the coefficients of univ_ip 
become much smaller and less significant. We also expect them to have positive effects on 
UIC performance. 
The survey collected further information on project membership, project duration, 
technological orientation, public subsidy for UIC, and uncertainty surrounding the UIC 
project. As a variable of membership structure, we include in the model the number of 
participants (firms, universities, and public research institutes) (number_participants)
9. In 
addition to project duration (proyr), the technological orientation of the UIC may also be 
related with the technological success of UIC. Thus, from the survey data, we create dummy 
variables of technological orientation in three categories (basic research, applied research, 
and development), among which the first one is regarded as the baseline reference. In order 
to control for the effect of public subsidy, we use the dummy variable subsidy, which takes 
on the value of one if the UIC received public funds. Finally, we control for market and 
technology unpredictability surrounding the UIC project using the variables unpre_mkt and 
unpre_tech. These variables are measured by 7-point Likert scales (Appendix 1). 
9  UIC projects may include more than one university and/or other firms and research institutes 
(research consortia). The other variables about the partner university refer to the most important 













   
Firm characteristics 
Finally, we use the same variables of firm characteristics (age, emp, rd_ratio, d_bio, 
and  d_micro) as in the probit model in the second-step OLS. Firm age (age) may be 
regarded as business experience and network formation. Firm size (emp) is a proxy for 
organizational capability, and R&D ratio (rd_ratio) is a measure of R&D capability or 
absorptive capability. We predict that these firm characteristics positively contribute to UIC 
performance. UIC performance may differ across technology fields, which we consider with 
dummy variables of technological fields (d_bio and d_micro). 
5.2. Data source and sample 
Our empirical analyses are based on original survey data. We conducted a postal survey 
in summer 2008 among 9,882 firms in Japan with 20 or more employees in the fields of 
biotechnology, microelectronics, and software, and obtained 1,732 responses (17.5%). We 
selected these three technology fields as representing major science-based industries in 
which UIC is especially important (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch 1998). Our sample firms 
were extracted from the company database of Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR) and the 
directory of the Japan Bioindustry Association (JBA). 
Among the respondents, 1,560 firms could in fact be classified into the above three 
technological fields, and of them, 264 (17%) completed UIC during the preceding three 
years (the sub-sample for the second-step analysis). The basic statistics of the dependent 
and independent variables are summarized in Table 1. 
[Table 1 around here] 
Among the variables of UIC performance, those of satisfaction have relatively higher mean 
scores (4.9 for expected_results and 5.1 for tech_success), but those of more concrete 
outcomes have lower scores (3.5 for patents and 4.1 for products). With regard to partner 
characteristics, the mean score for univ_ip is 5.0, suggesting that the IP policy of the partner 
university is quite positively evaluated by the respondents; 83% of the (most important) 
partner universities are national ones. On average, 4.6 member organizations are involved in 
a UIC project, which comes to an end within 28 months on average. 20% of the projects 
target basic research, and 55% of the projects obtained public subsidy for R&D. 














                                                 
 
classified into biotechnology (23%), microelectronics (20%), and software (48%)
10. The 
average ratio of R&D expenditure to sales (R&D intensity) is 4.6%; 63% of top managers 
of the sample firms obtained undergraduate education (up to bachelor degree), while 10% 
have master or doctor degrees. 
6. Estimation results 
In this section, we first present the results of the second-step estimation of the 
determinants of UIC performance, focusing on the impact of the university IP policy, before 
reporting the results of the first-step estimation on the determinants of UIC participation. 
6.1. Second step: UIC performance 
Table 2 shows the estimation results of the second-step OLS regarding UIC 
performance with regression coefficients and robust standard errors. We have four 
dependent variables: expected_results, tech_success, patents, and products. Specification 
(1) does not include ex post project characteristics (commuquality and commitment), while 
Specification (2) includes both of them to check the mediation effects. 
[Table 2 around here] 
First,  univ_ip has positive and significant effects on all dependent variables in 
Specification (1). This result confirms H1. Indeed, the IP policy of the partner university 
matters much for the success of a UIC project. A clear and equitable IP policy that can be 
flexibly applied according to the needs of participating firms contributes to UIC 
performance. When the variables of project coordination (commuquality and commitment) 
are included in the estimation, Specification (2), the coefficients of univ_ip are still 
significant, but much smaller with lower significance levels than those of Specification (1). 
This result supports H2 and shows that the efforts of project coordination mediate the effect 
of the university IP policy on UIC performance. The IP policy of the partner university loses 
its importance after controlling for the measures of coordination during the UIC. Therefore, 
the effect of IP policy on UIC performance may be largely attributed to the improvement of 
coordination in the project. 
10  9% of the respondents did not provide information on their technological fields. These firms were 




   
    
 
 
                                                 
 
 
   
 
We confirm positive and significant effects of the university IP policy on UIC 
performance even after controlling for improved project coordination, but we are unable to 
explain this remaining effect. We believe that universities with a favorable IP policy may 
also have a well-managed organization as well as transparent and favorable rules related to 
UIC (for example, regarding faculty’s obligation, graduate course education, or donation), 
which could contribute to UIC performance. 
The national university dummy (national_univ) has a weak but positive and significant 
effect on UIC performance except for patent application (patents) in Specification (1). The 
effect of national universities is no more significant after controlling for project 
coordination—Specification (2). The research capability of the partner university (research 
capability) has positive and significant effects on expected_results and tech_success. 
Distance to the partner university (distance) affects only tech_success, but positively, 
suggesting that research collaboration with a university in a distant region is more likely to 
be evaluated as a technological success than that with a nearby university. 
The result that distance, and not proximity to the partner, leads to higher 
technological satisfaction is contrary to the findings of most previous studies (Acs et al. 
2002; Anselin et al. 1997; Furman et al. 2010; Jaffe 1989; Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; 
Rondé and Hussler 2005)
11, but consistent with Japanese studies such as Nishimura and 
Okamuro (2011a)
12. We may attribute this result to a better matching: The farther the 
university partners are searched for, the higher the probability that an optimal partner can be 
found, because an optimal research partner is not always located nearby. We may argue that 
this matching effect exceeds the advantage of proximity, even after controlling for the 
evaluation of research capability of the partner. 
With regard to project characteristics, we find that the results differ across the 
dependent variables. The strength of ex ante ties (close_relationship) has no significant 
effect on all measures of UIC performance except for tech_success in Specification (1). The 
strength of contractual safeguards (contract) has a positive but weak effect on 
expected_results and tech_success. In contrast to these ex ante project characteristics, ex 
post characteristics (commu_quality and commitment) show a positive and significant 
11However, these studies examine the effect of proximity on firm performance, whereas we examine 
the effect on project performance. Thus, we cannot directly compare our results with those of the 
previous studies. As far as we know, few empirical studies directly investigate the effect of 
geographical proximity to a research partner in UIC on project outcomes. An exception is 
Mora-Valentin et al. (2004), who do not find significant effect of geographical proximity to a 
research partner on project outcomes.
12In a similar vein, Zucker and Darby (2001) find no evidence of geographically localized 



















                                                 
 
 
impact on UIC performance except for patent application (patents). Thus, ex post 
characteristics of UIC projects are in general more important for UIC performance than ex 
ante characteristics (initial conditions). Besides, as mentioned above, we found that these ex 
post variables mediate the effect of IP policy of the partner university (univ_ip). 
It is also noteworthy that most of the other project and firm characteristics have no or 
little effect on UIC performance except for project duration and firm size. We again observe 
some differences among the dependent variables: patent application (patent) is significantly 
associated with several variables of these project and firm characteristics, while 
expected_results is not correlated with them. 
The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) is sufficiently low (1.62 for Specification (1) 
and 1.70 for Specification (2)), so that we may exclude the multicollinearity problem. The 
inverse Mills ratio is not significant except for expected_results. Thus, we confirm and 
correct sample selection bias only for this dependent variable. However, the results of the 
first step are also worth reporting, because sample selection bias is confirmed for a part of 
the estimations. 
6.2. First step: UIC participation 
Table 3 shows the empirical results in the first step on the determinants of UIC 
participation. In the probit model, we include top managers’ education and the firm 
characteristics. We show the marginal effect of each variable on the probability of UIC 
participation. 
[Table 3 around here] 
First, we find that top managers’ education is strongly related to the propensity of UIC 
participation. All variables—univ_soc,  univ_nat,  grad_soc, and grad_nat—have a 
significantly positive impact on UIC participation
13. In addition, the marginal effects of 
grad_soc and grad_nat are larger than those of univ_soc and univ_nat. This means that a 
firm managed by a top manager with a higher educational level is more likely to engage in 
UIC. However, our results also suggest that top managers with university degrees in the 
human or social sciences are by no means less willing to cooperate with universities 
13In an unreported estimation, we include education variables of both top managers and top 
researchers to find that only the dummy for Ph.D. in natural science has a significant impact on UIC 
participation. Since our sample consists of SMEs, the top manager and the top researcher of a firm 
















compared to those with degrees in the natural sciences. This is probably because top 
managers with a natural science background tend to prefer in-house R&D to UIC because of 
the “not-invented-here” (NIH) syndrome. 
Second, with regard to firm characteristics, the R&D ratio to sales (rd_ratio) has a 
positive and significant impact on UIC participation. Therefore, as we indeed expected, a 
firm with a higher R&D capability is more likely to participate in UIC. Unexpectedly, 
however, we find that firm size (emp) has no significant impact on UIC participation, which 
means that small size in itself is not a barrier to UIC. 
Finally, we find that the propensity of UIC participation significantly differs across 
technological fields: Biotech and microelectronics firms are more willing to conduct UIC 
than software firms. This suggests that technological opportunities matter for engaging in 
UIC. 
7. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the impact of university IP policy on UIC 
performance with original survey data from Japanese firms, controlling for potential sample 
selection bias using Heckman’s two-step procedure. The estimation results show that the IP 
policy of partner universities regarding clearness, equitability, and flexibility indeed matters, 
but its impact on UIC performance is mediated by the quality of communication between 
the partners and the level of the firm’s commitment to the project. We also found that some 
other project characteristics significantly affect UIC performance, although the effects differ 
across the dependent variables and thus depend on how we define UIC performance. 
Contrary to the results of most previous literature, the distance to the partner is positively 
correlated with UIC performance. We further found that firms’ R&D intensity and top 
managers’ education level are important determinants of UIC participation, while firm size 
has no influence after controlling for these variables. 
This paper has some major contributions to the literature. First, it sheds light on the 
effect of the university IP policy on successful UIC, which is important in the context of 
rapid changes in the university system. Second, it examines the determinants of both UIC 
participation and UIC performance in an integrative framework and hence checks and 
controls for sample selection bias in performance estimation. Third, it reveals the role of top 
managers’ education as an important factor of UIC participation. Fourth and last, it focuses 
on UIC in Japan, on which few empirical studies have been carried out despite the 










However, as with most previous studies, our study is based on survey data from the firm 
side, so that we cannot consider the factors of university researchers. A matched-data 
analysis using survey data from both sides of UIC would be desirable for further research. 
Specifically, we measure the characteristics of university IP policy by subjective and 
retrospective evaluations by partner firms. A more objective measurement should be 
discussed. Further, the IP policy and other project or partner characteristics are measured as 
one-shot evaluations. Considering the recent development of university IP policy, future 
research should address its dynamics more explicitly. Lastly, we cannot exclude the 
possibility of sample selection bias in the sense that failed attempts of UIC due to poor or 
unfavorable IP policy of potential partner universities are not observable. We should collect 
information about failed partnerships to cope with this problem. 
Despite such weakness, our findings have the following important implications for 
managers. First, in searching for a research partner among universities, managers should 
also look at the IP policy of the universities. Further, initial conditions of the project 
significantly affect UIC performance. Specifically, it is important to find an optimal partner 
even if located in a distant area. However, our findings also show how to manage 
cooperation right during the project may be more important for performance than the initial 
settings. We also find that firm characteristics and project size do not significantly affect 
UIC performance. Therefore, how to manage a project is more important for UIC 
performance than who (which firm) engages in the project. Even if small businesses have 
limited R&D resources, they can successfully cooperate in R&D with universities with 
appropriate project management expertise. 
Regarding policy implications, our results suggest that it is essential for successful UIC 
to establish a clear, equitable, and flexibly applicable IP policy. Moreover, given the 
negative effect of closeness to the partner on UIC performance, it is important for policy 
makers to encourage and support partner search in UIC in wider geographic areas. 
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Appendix 1: Variable construction of partner and project characteristics 
univ_ip: mean of the evaluation scores of the following items: 

Please evaluate how clearly the partner university’s policy on intellectual property rights 

was defined (where 1 = do not agree and 7 = fully agree). 

University intellectual property policies were clear and easily understood. 

University intellectual property policies were sufficiently flexible to meet our firm’s needs.
 
University intellectual property policies were equitable in revenue and royalty sharing. 

close_relationship: the evaluation score of the following question: 

Prior to this UI research collaboration, how close was your relationship with the university 

partner (where 1 = not at all close and 7 = very close)? 

research capability: the evaluation score of the following question:
 
How did your company evaluate the research capability of your partner university before
 




We believed they were scientifically leading in their field.
 
contract: mean of the evaluation scores of the following items: 

How clearly were the following issues defined at the beginning of the research collaboration 

(where 1 = there was no mutual understanding and 7 = the mutual understanding was 

exactly defined in a written document)? 

Roles and responsibilities of each partner 

Performance obligations of each partner 

Project schedules (timing and deadlines) 

Project budget (how it should be used and checked) 

Data/secrecy protection, publication of the findings 

Profit sharing from new products and processes, etc. 

Legal procedures in case a partner does not fulfill his role or obligation
 
Procedures in case of unexpected events
 
commuquality: mean of the evaluation scores of the following items: 



















commitment: the evaluation score of the following item:
 
Please evaluate the communication and interaction with the university research partner in
 
the partnership (if there was more than one partner, please refer to the most important 

university research partner; 1 = strongly disagree… 7 = strongly agree). 

We were very committed to this university partner.
 
unpre_mkt, unpre_tech: the evaluation scores of the following items, respectively
 
Please respond regarding the extent of market and technological uncertainties surrounding 

this UI R&D collaboration (1–7). 

The market surrounding the research collaboration was very predictable and easy to forecast 

versus unpredictable and hard to anticipate. 

The technological developments surrounding the research collaboration were 





Table 1: Basic statistics of the variables 
Variables  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent var.
　　 uic  1560  0.17  0.38  0  1
　　 expected_results  255  4.86  1.63  1  7
　　 tech_success  253  5.08  1.66  1  7
　　 patents  256  3.45  2.32  1  7
　　 products  256  4.09  2.14  1  7 
Independent var.
　　 univ_ip  253  4.95  1.64  1  7
　　 national_univ  260  0.83  0.38  0  1
　　 research_capability  254  5.16  1.63  1  7
　　 distance  255  3.21  1.77  1  6
　　 close_relationship  213  5.13  1.75  1  7
　　 contract  256  4.70  1.37  1  7
　　 commuquality  259  5.33  1.31  1  7
　　 commitment  251  4.43  1.83  1  7
　　 number_participants  244  4.62  4.74  2  48
　　log (proyr )  250  3.35  0.65  0.69  4.79
　　 basic research  258  0.20  0.40  0  1
　　 applied research  258  0.41  0.49  0  1
　　 development  258  0.39  0.49  0  1
　　 subsidy  256  0.55  0.50  0  1
　　 unpre_mkt  253  4.64  1.70  1  7
　　 unpre_tech  252  4.70  1.58  1  7 
Firm characteristics
　　log (age )  1549  3.09  0.72  0.69  4.71
　　log (emp )  1525  3.93  0.96  0  7.91
　　 rd_ratio  1437  4.63  12.74  0  100
　　 d_bio  1560  0.23  0.42  0  1
　　 d_micro  1560  0.20  0.40  0  1
　　 d_soft  1560  0.48  0.50  0  1 
Top managers' education
　　 univ_soc  1441  0.30  0.46  0  1
　　 univ_nat  1441  0.33  0.47  0  1
　　 grad_soc  1441  0.01  0.12  0  1





         
 
Table 2: Determinants of UIC performance (second step) 
expected_results  tech_success  patents  products 
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 








































































































































































































































































































































Uncensored obs  127  125  127  125  128  126  128  126 
Censored obs  1112  1112  1112  1112  1112  1112  1112  1112 


















Mean VIF  1.62  1.70  1.62  1.70  1.62  1.70  1.62  1.70 
Note 1: Level of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 




       
Table 3: Determinants of UIC participation (first step) 
Marginal effect  Robust S.E. 
Top managers' education
　 univ_soc  0.064**  0.030
　 univ_nat  0.079***  0.029
　 grad_soc  0.358***  0.129
　 grad_nat  0.088**  0.050 
Firm characteristics
　 log (age) －0.020  0.014
　 log (emp)  0.006  0.010
　 rd_ratio  0.004**  0.002
　 d_bio  0.179***  0.034
　 d_micro  0.156***  0.033 
N  1309
Log pseudolikelihood  －494.155 
Wald chi2(9) = 86.23 (p=0.000) 
Note: Level of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
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